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FACULTY COMMENT
PEREMPTORY NORMS - MAYBE EVEN LESS
METAPHYSICAL AND WORRISOME
ROBERT ROSENSTOCK*
Editor's Note: In the Fall 1974 issue of the DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POuCY an article by N. G. Onuf and Richard K. Birney
entitled PEREMPTORY NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THEIR SOURCE, FUNCTION AND FUTURE was published. The article dealt with the development
of peremptory norms as a category of international law, with special
reference to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
The following critique takes exception to several of the contentions of
Messrs. Onuf and Birney.

Messrs. Onuf and Birney are to be commended for their interesting, earnest, for the most part commendably lucid, and stimulatingly
imaginative effort to clarify some troublesome questions concerning
peremptory norms.' There are, however, four aspects of the work
which require further comment: (a) their failure to examine the question more fully from a pragmatic base, (b) their over-generalized
imputation of depth and foresight to Non-Western advocates of the
relevant Articles of the Vienna Convention, (c) the strong criticism
of the Western States' failure to clarify the concept at the Vienna
Conference, and (d) the fact that they wrote so brief an article on so
complex a subject.
I. BASIS FOR PEREMPTORY NORMS
After correctly discarding dangerous and obsolete quasi-natural
law theories and hierarchically arranged notions, the authors speak
of "differing importance." Yet they never appear to seek a pragmatic
rationale for "importance." A case can be made for importance which
has nothing to do with psychology, the drive for change, or the origin
of the norm. What is missing is an analysis of international law which
asks whether there are certain rules or norms which are indispensable
to the very existence of the type of international society all states are
pledged to support, and other norms which are means of implementing these basic rules or arrangements of convenience.' Such an analy* Legal Affairs Adviser, United States Mission to the United Nations, member
of the United States delegation to the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties; LL.B.
Columbia University; A.B. Cornell. The views expressed herein are the personal views
of the author and not necessarily those of the United States government.
1. Onuf & Birney, Peremptory Norms of International Law: Their Source, Function and Future, 4 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POuCv 187 (1974).
2. The fact that the concept of peremptory norms has only been generally ac-
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sis would be likely to yield the conclusion that all states have pledged
themselves to a minimum world order and accepted by treaty or
custom and usage that, if this order is to survive, war may not be
considered a legitimate policy; what Justice Holmes called the hypostasis of prophecy. This general view, expressed first in codified form
by the Kellogg-Briand Pact and subsequently by Article 2, paragraph
4 of the Charter of the United Nations, would be regarded as a norm
of so fundamental a character and of such universal concern that no
two states could contract out of the prohibition.3 The length of time
it took this norm to evolve speaks against the apparent fear of the
authors that a forest of peremptory norms will spring up in the near
future much less that the creation of new peremptory norms will be
used to alter the existing rules in some radical fashion. There may
well be other norms which are regarded as equally basic in the sense
that they cannot be violated or derogated without radically altering
and thus endangering the very existence of international order. Respect for fundamental human rights or at least the unacceptability
of total transgression of these rights in an organized form such as
slavery or the policy of apartheid may be further examples.
This approach is fully consistent with the authors' analysis that
peremptory norms "whether in becoming norms or in becoming peremptory or both, must be considered in terms of the sources of international law."' What this above suggested analysis of the nature of
peremptory norms does, in effect, is to undercut the authors' suggestion that peremptory norms need not be general. If the peremptory
character of the norm derives from its perceived fundamental importance to the structure of international relations, it is inconceivable
that they could be other than universally applicable in nature. The
fact that Article 53 of the Vienna Convention requires that "a peremptory norm of international law . . . [be] accepted and recognized by the community of states as a whole as a norm from which
cepted in a context which involves a formal system of judicial settlement of disputes
would seem to mitigate the argument sometimes made that the international community is in too primitive a state to think in terms of public order.
3. The primary if not the only effect of the acceptance of a peremptory norm is
that it establishes the illegality of a contract which is inconsistent therewith. It would
be well to consider peremptory norms in the simple and unterrifying terms of the
international analogue of the domestic law relating to illegal contracts. Cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES §116
(1965).
4. The authors' simple and direct acknowledgement of this fact makes it difficult
to understand why the authors seem so perturbed at the attenuated implications they
work so hard to squeeze out of the concluding phrase of Article 53. One's puzzlement
is enhanced by the fact that the authors demonstrate a sensitivity, at the bottom of
page 191 and the top of page 192, for the subtle nature of the relationship in the treaty
process between codification and the creation of a new norm.
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no derogation is permitted" 5 not only underlines the inherent universality of the concept but provides a safeguard against the sort of
development the authors fear.
II.

RATIONALE OF NON-WESTERN PROPONENTS

It may be that the authors have perceived a rationale for NonWestern proponents ofjus cogens which, although never articulated,
did in fact form the underlying basis for their positions. If, however,
one abjures the hazardous effort to analyze motives which were never
articulated, one is left with a much simpler if related explanation. To
begin with, it would be useful to recall that Part V of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties was not intended to be and is not
a philosophical disquisition on the sources of law or a political howto manual on the method of altering general international law. Part
V of the Convention is rather a list of reasons for asserting the invalidity of treaties.
It seems to this writer more likely that Non-Western States believed, rightly or wrongly, that many treaties had been imposed upon
them or that there was a negotiating imbalance at the time of their
drafting because of superior negotiating skill or greater knowledge of
the details. This is certainly what the record of statements of NonWestern spokesmen indicates. The Non-Western States, moreover,
feared that unless they established some grounds for invalidity, they
would be subject to retributive action of one form or another under
the banner of an unmitigated and omnipotent doctrine of pactasunt
servanda. While this analysis bears a strong resemblance to the authors' analysis, it is far less sweeping and thus cannot be used as a
basis for constructing an intent to use the General Assembly for the
widespread creation of new peremptory norms.
II.

WESTERN FAILURE TO CLARIFY

The strength of the criticism of Western spokesmen for failing to
demand hard answers to hard questions is, it is submitted, due partly
to the authors' insistence on perceiving Article 53 as potentially undermining the whole of international law rather than constituting a
limited safety valve with carefully constructed procedural safeguards
of a type long accepted in the vaguely analogous field of the domestic
law of contracts.' Before leaping to the conclusion that Western
5. Convention on the Law of Treaties done May 22, 1969 conveniently found in 8
698 (1969).
6. It should also be noted that the United States did not suddenly give in to the
acceptance of the doctrine of jus cogens under the pressure of time and expediency.
As early as 1963 no less an American spokesman and leading lawyer than Francis T.
P. Plimpton stated in the Legal Committee of the General Assembly with regard to
ILC's draft article on jus cogens "[It] would do much to advance the rule of international law and should be supported." U. N. Doc. A/C.6/SR 784, para. 30 (1963).
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
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spokesmen were careless, preoccupied or afraid of exposing sensitivities unnecessarily, the authors would do well to consider the degree
of specificity, or more precisely, the lack thereof that exists with
regard to other subtle grounds for invalidity such as "error" (Article
48), "fraud" (Article 49), or "fundamental change of circumstance"
(Article 62). It would also seem useful if the authors considered the
extent to which the notion of "contrary to public policy" or "ordre
publique" is spelled out with satisfying clarity in Anglo-American or
French law.
The most important oversight of the authors is their failure to
even note the role played by the dispute settlement provisions of the
Vienna Convention. The consistent position of the United States and
virtually all of the Western nations was that of willingness to accept
the notion of peremptory norms if there was some reasonable means
of determining what they were. 7 This took the precise form of insisting on meaningful dispute settlement provisions. The Convention
provides that all disputes relating to the Articles that deal with peremptory norms, Articles 53 and 64, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice.8 The inclusion of acceptable dispute settlement provisions relating to peremptory norms and to the whole of
Part V was the key to the successful conclusion of the Conference.
It is difficult to be certain whether the authors' quantum leap
from a somewhat overrefined analysis of the background and meaning of Article 53 to conclusions on the nature and implications of the
General Assembly as a source of law would be more comprehensible
had they chosen to write a longer, less telescoped article. Absent
evidence to the contrary, it seems more likely that the leap reflects
the authors' imaginative capacity in the long jump rather than the
existence of any logical, political or even psychological bridge.
In sum, I wish modestly to suggest that if the wake of the practioner may contain pitfalls based on expediency, that of the scholar
may contain strawmen created by overrefined analyses.'
7. See statements to the effect by the U.S. and various other states. Official
Records of the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 39/11, at 472-73 (1968).
8. See Int'l L. Comm'n. Report, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, at 180, U.N. Doc. A/6309
Rev. 1 (1966) for early U. S. statements on the importance of the International Court
of Justice in this context.
9. The writer admits that his defense of the decisions relating to Article 53 may
be colored by his having been, as a member of the American Delegation to the Conference, implicated to some extent in the actions. The writer also pleads guilty to responding to the authors with a note which may well be vulnerable to his own criticism of
dealing with very complex issues in too brief a manner.

